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Many aspects of American society, including its legal system, operate to the disadvantage of minorities. 
Obvious examples include inequities in our criminal justice system and in school funding. Much has been 
written on those and other topics. This article focuses on another example, specifically on how a sweeping 
change to an obscure banking rule regulating the check collection process has negatively affected consumers 
in general, and minority groups in particular.  
U.S. check collections require a complex system comprised of a variety of institutions including 
commercial banks, savings and loans, savings banks, and credit unions, as well as the customers who 
rely upon them to collect payments from far and near. Traditionally, the check collection process, 
including the timing rules under U.C.C. Article Four, was inherently cumbersome and slow to honor the 
payee’s right to receive immediate payment of funds from the paying bank. Frustration among payees, 
which grew due to not having their funds available fast enough because of delays that were inherent within 
the system, led lawmakers and others to reform the check collection timing rules..  
It has now been more than twenty years since Congress passed the Expedited Funds Availability Act 
(EFAA), which empowered the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to regulate the speed with which 
commercial banks are required to make funds available to depositors after their checks were deposited for 
collection. There is evidence, however, that these reforms have had an negative impact on checking account 
customers as a whole, but in particular, a disproportionate impact on minority communities. 
Specifically, by reducing the maximum amount of waiting time between the date of deposit and the date 
when funds are available to deposit customers, the reforms also reduced the time that the funds were 
available to the check-issuing consumer. Thus, in every checking transaction, checking account customers 
lost the benefit of the float that was built into every transaction under the traditional U.C.C. rules.  
 It is my thesis, therefore, that recent reforms in the timing rules that regulate the speed of the check 
collection process have indeed reduced the wait time for funds to be available, but have also resulted in 
increases in the appetite for various risky cash management alternatives by consumers to obtain the 
money that under old timing rules would stay in their deposit accounts for a longer period. Put another 
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way, consumers who issued checks liked float, too! To address this problem, I will propose two 
recommendations that can provide a remedy for consumers, at their option. First, that the definition of 
“check” should be changed under both state and federal commercial law to remove the limitation that all 
checks are due on demand. Second, I propose that the federal check collection timing rules should be 
amended to require banks to honor checks that are payable on a definite due date just as they honor 
those that are payable on demand. 
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This Article is organized as follows:  
 Part II provides an overview of the check collections systems under the Uniform Commercial 
Code (U.C.C.) as well as the pre-reform timing of payment issues that persisted under the midnight 
deadline rules. Part III provides an overview and description of the characteristics of the new federal 
regulations that have been added to augment the state regulations. Particularly with respect to the new 
timing rules, it also provides a comparison of the operation of new timing rules to that of the traditional 
timing rules.  
Part IV describes the changes in consumer behavior since the federal reforms went into effect, 
and posits that data revealing a dramatic increase in risky behavior by consumers, specifically and 
disproportionately among minority groups, show a connection between these behaviors and the reform 
of the check collection timing rules. 
Part V contains two recommendations that provide a solution to the problems that the 
regulatory reforms have caused consumers. The first recommendation is that both the U.C.C. and 
Regulation CC’s statutory definition of “check” should be amended to allow bank drafts to be treated 
like all other negotiable instruments, which are able to be payable either at a definite time or on 
demand—at the option of the parties at the time of the transaction. The second recommendation is for 
bank regulators to require banks to honor presentations of checks that are not payable on demand on 
the definite date in the future when they become due and payable.  
Part VI provides a brief rebuttal to some potential objections that may be raised in response to 
the recommendations made in Section V. Part VII is a brief summary and conclusion. 
II. OVERVIEW OF PRE-REFORM SYSTEM OF CHECK COLLECTIONS, 
INCLUDING MIDNIGHT DEADLINE TIMING RULE  
Article 3 of the U.C.C. governs the rights and obligations of parties to negotiable instruments. Its 
provisions require that the transfer of checks occur using a special form of transfer called “negotiation” 
through which the transferee becomes a “holder” and, therefore, is entitled to enforce it.1 Under U.C.C. 
Article 3, negotiable instruments fall into two broad categories: notes,2 which are always two-party 
instruments,3 and drafts,4 which are always three-party instruments.5 The definition of “Negotiable 
Instrument, U.C.C. 3-104, allows parties to decide whether their instruments will be payable immediately 
(demand instruments) or at a definite date in the future (time instruments)6. Notes and drafts can be 
issued without involving a bank as one of the parties. If, however, a bank is a party to a three party draft, 
it becomes a “check”7 as defined by 3-104(f).  
                                           
1 U.C.C. §§ 3-201, 3-301 (amended 2002). 
2 See generally U.C.C. §§ 3-104(a), 3-103(a)(8), 3-103(a)(12) (amended 2002). 
3 The parties to notes are referred as the “maker” and “payee.” 
4 See generally U.C.C. §§ 3-104(a), 3-103(a)(8), 3-103(a)(12) (amended 2002). 
5 Drawer, Payee, Drawee/Paying Bank or Paying Bank under Regulation CC 12 C.F.R. § 229.2.  
6 See U.C.C. § 3-104(f) (amended 2002). 
7 The terms "checks," "negotiable bank drafts," and "items" are all used interchangeably through the relevant 
state and federal regulations and this article. 
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In addition to defining “check” as “a draft drawn on a bank,” Article 3 also defines “check” as 
“payable on demand.”8 Thus, while the U.C.C. provides parties to notes and drafts broad flexibility to, 
choose the precise date when they will be payable, parties to checks are denied this ability.9 Applicable 
reforms at the federal level, referred to colloquially as “Reg. CC,” define “check” in a similar manner as 
“a negotiable demand draft drawn on or payable through . . . a bank . . . .”10  
Somewhat perversely, it is because checks are 3-party instruments that it is so difficult—arguably 
logistically impossible—to pay them immediately upon demand. This is because all three parties to a 
check have interests that must be balanced—and that takes time—even after the check is presented to 
the drawer’s bank for payment.  
  Pre-reform rules under Article 4 of the U.C.C. impose strict timing rules for check collection 
once an item is deposited for collection. Among other things, these pre-reform rules required payment to 
occur within a limited amount of time after the check was presented for payment.11 During the collection 
process any bank in the chain of collection has up to two days before it must forward the check to the 
next bank in the collection chain. This timing of collection and of payment rule is called the “midnight 
deadline rule.”  
Specifically, a bank’s “midnight deadline” is defined as “midnight of the banking day following 
the banking day of receipt.”12 Under Article 4, each bank that touches a check during the collections 
process has a separate midnight deadline.13 That means that every person entitled to enforce the check 
must wait up to two days, multiplied by the total number of banks involved in the process. Of course, 
under Article 4 the actual demand for payment does not occur until the check reached the only bank that 
could make the payment decision—the paying bank.  
Once the check finally reaches its ultimate destination, the paying bank is actually allowed to 
await the expiration of two different midnight deadlines prior to becoming legally accountable for the 
amount of the item. First, the paying bank has until midnight of the day of receipt to decide whether to 
give provisional and revocable credit for the check. Second, if the paying bank gives provisional credit 
for the check before midnight of the first banking day on which it receives the check for payment, then 
the U.C.C. extends the deadline by which the paying bank must make a final decision to either pay or to 
dishonor the check to midnight of the next banking day. Remarkably, it is not until the expiration of the 
paying bank’s second midnight deadline that it must make a final decision to pay or to dishonor the item 
at which time it will either be finally paid or notice of dishonor will be sent to the depositary bank.14  
                                           
8 Id. 
9 Id. (distinguishing “checks” as a special subset of drafts payable on demand and drawn on a bank). U.C.C. § 1-
104 (amended 2002) allows parties to vary this default rule by agreement, but there is no evidence that banks include 
such a waiver in their customer agreements, nor that they honor such items. 
10 See Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229.2(k) (2012). Recent events are of importance here. One of my proposals 
is to redefine the definition of check to allow consumers to choose the date when the check will become payable. See 
infra Section V(A) and accompanying footnotes. After the passage of Dodd-Frank, that task is not so simple as merely 
petitioning the Federal Reserve. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 124 STAT. 1376, 
Public Law 111-203, §§ 1011, 1022 (establishing Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and giving it rulemaking 
power over federal consumer financial law).  
11 U.C.C. §§ 4-203, 4-301 (amended 2002). 
12 Id. § 4-103(a)(10). 
13 Id. §§ 4-203, 4-302. 
14 Id. § 4-202. 
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The “midnight deadline” rule, taken alone, provides no incentives for the collecting banks to 
take action before the expiration of their midnight deadline.15 This is only slightly less true for the paying 
bank—which is not technically a collecting bank.16 The paying bank faces the daunting risk of becoming 
accountable for the amount of the item if it has not completed its process for determining whether the 
item is properly payable from its customer’s account prior to the expiration of its midnight deadlines.17 
Collecting banks (including the depositary bank, any intermediary banks, and the presenting bank), 
however, are only liable for their negligence, if any, for failing to meet their midnight deadlines.18 
Under U.C.C. rules, for the depositor awaiting receipt of the collected funds, the midnight 
deadline clock does not begin to run until the check is actually presented to the paying bank when the 
demand for payment officially occurred. As an example, the following is an illustration of a short check 
collection involving two intermediary collecting banks on opposite coasts. The length of the wait for the 
payment decision depended on how many banks were involved in the collection, but could generally be 
reduced to the formula 2X = D, where X is the number of collecting banks and D is the number of days 
the payee must wait for payment. The paying bank will generally have two days instead of one because 
the rule that they must make a final payment decision by midnight of the banking day of receipt is 
extended until their real midnight deadline if they give provisional credit on that day. Thus, in a 
transaction involving a depositary bank, a paying bank, and two Federal Reserve bank branches on 
opposite coasts as well as an additional intermediary bank on either coast, the average length of time that 
elapsed between the date of deposit and the date of expiration of the drawee’s midnight deadline under 
Article 4 was usually more than ten days.19  
Historically, the U.C.C. required privity among the parties to a check, including all of the banks 
involved in the collection and payment process. This requirement, in conjunction with the liberal 
midnight deadline timing of payment rule, complicated the relationships among the collecting and paying 
banks, and added more time to the already cumbersome collections process. Consequently, despite the 
fact that checks are demand instruments, because of the logistics of the national bank check collections 
system, they were never capable of being paid immediately—neither as a practical matter nor under the 
applicable U.C.C. rules.  
The problems caused by this slow process were not limited to their effects on consumers. The 
old check collection rules also produced problems associated with a financial concept called “float.” In 
general, float results when a bank is credited with funds before they are disbursed from a payee’s 
account.  One specific consequence of bank float that concerned the Federal Reserve Bank Governing 
Board is that the funds associated with checks in the collections system were being accounted for in the 
accounts of multiple banks, simultaneously. This is due to the banking industry’s practice of booking 
provisional (temporary revocable) credit for checks on the presumption that they will be honored when 
presented to the paying bank for payment. This approach, through which the banks account for the 
value of checks while they move through the collection process, while efficient from an accounting entry 
viewpoint, created a problematic inflationary impact insofar as it distorted the actual balances of money 
on deposit throughout the U.S. monetary system at any given moment. This type of float results from 
the fact that funds behind each check were concurrently reflected in the account balances of all of the 
banks (depositary, collecting, and paying) during the collection process. Consequently, this float 
                                           
15 Id. 
16 Id. § 4-105(3)–(5). 
17 U.C.C. §§ 4-301–4-302 (amended 2002). 
18 Id. §§ 4-105, 4-202, 4-203. 
19 2 days x 5 banks = 10 days. 
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artificially inflates the size supply of money in the banking system20 and necessarily affects the Federal 
Reserve Governing Board's determination of monetary policy.21 
This was the confluence of problems that the U.C.C. could not, or would not, address that 
eventually led to federal intervention by Congress. Consumer protection activists and the Federal 
Reserve Governing Board, for their respective reasons, sought reform of the check collection process in 
part out of frustration with the inaction of state legislatures and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Law, which had recently revised U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 extensively 
without changing the midnight deadline collection and payment timing rules. Moreover, Congress was 
becoming more engaged in consumer protection and was also aware of the Fed’s increasing concern 
over the float in the monetary supply. However, it is important to keep in mind throughout the following 
sections that although Congressional reforms of timing rules in the check collection process were 
justified and overdue, they were not done in a way that proved advantageous for all consumers.  
Specifically, the loss of float time created destructive consequences for poor consumers, the 
majority of whom are members of minority groups. As will be explored later on in this article, this new 
reform resulted in a disproportionate increase of risky behaviors such as borrowing money using payday 
loans, credit cards, and HELOCs. These increases were not merely coincidental. Historical data and 
social studies suggest that these industries purposefully targeted minority groups for exploitation. The 
financial devices in question frequently have significant financial costs. A typical payday loan, for 
instance, may end up costing the consumer hundreds if not thousands of dollars in excess of the loan 
principal. That is startling, given that a typical payday loan is for only a small amount of money. In the 
aggregate, these instruments drain millions of dollars from local communities, making economic and 
social advancement all the more difficult. 
III. FEDERAL INTERVENTION AND REFORM INITIATIVES 
 Even though U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 were amended extensively in 1990, the timing of collection 
rules in the “Revised Articles” was not significantly revised.22 Several state legislatures took steps during 
the 1980s to limit the length of hold periods, but the prevailing U.C.C. timing rules remained largely 
unchanged.23 Most notably, the Revised Articles governing check collections retained the midnight 
deadline rules despite an ever increasing chorus of customer complaints about the length of their wait 
times for their funds to be available following deposits of checks for collection.  
In the absence of a meaningful state level response to the unacceptably long waits for funds 
availability, Congress enacted two new statutes designed to speed up the check collection process and to 
expedite the availability of the depositor’s funds. First, in 1987 it passed the Expedited Funds Availability 
                                           
20 See Float, FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK (April 2007), 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed08.html (noting that “float is created when a Reserve Bank 
credits a bank for depositing a check but has not yet collected funds from the bank upon which the check is drawn. Both 
banks now list the funds on their books, and they continue to do so until the check is presented and the Reserve Bank 
collects funds from the bank on which the check is drawn. As a result, both banks have use of the same funds for a 
short time.”). 
21 See id. (noting that “although the amount of float is subject to random fluctuations, definite weekly and 
seasonal trends have been observed. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York uses these float trends to forecast float 
levels. The forecasts are given to the Open Market Desk, which implements the Federal Reserve's monetary policy. 
Using these forecasts and other information, the Open Market Desk buys and sells Government securities daily, usually 
in an attempt to smooth fluctuations in the aggregate level of bank reserves.”). 
22 WILLIAM WARREN & STEVEN WALT, PAYMENTS AND CREDITS 3 (Foundation Press 7th ed. 2007). 
23 Id. at 167. 
2013 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW 79 
 
 
Act (EFAA).24 An important part of the EFAA was its broad delegation of rulemaking authority to the 
Federal Reserve Governing Board. The Fed first exercised this authority when it promulgated Part 229 
of the Chapter 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations (12 C.F.R. Part 229) under the title “Availability of 
Funds and Collection of Checks (Regulation CC).”25 The second statute, The Check Collections For the 
Twenty First Century Act, commonly known as “Check 21”, was passed in 2004 and has resulted in 
changes to the way banks can process checks and allows them to create substitute checks using image 
technology. These additional rules have been added to Regulation CC. 
A.  The Expedited Funds Availability Act and Regulation CC 
Regulation CC was the first of two recent major reforms in the national bank check collection 
system in the United States. Regulation CC’s primary focus was to impose shorter time limitations within 
which depositary banks were required to make funds available to their checking account customers “as a 
matter of right.”26 To accomplish this, Regulation CC shifted the focus of the timing rules from counting 
the days after the demand is made to a paying bank, to focus on the number of days after the deposit 
before which the depositary bank would become accountable. Thus, Regulation CC shifted the liability 
for speeding up the timely payments away from the last bank in the process—the paying banks—and 
shifted the burden onto the first bank in the process—the depositary bank. Henceforth, funds would be 
made available within a set number of days after the deposit, regardless of how many intermediary banks 
were involved in the presentation of the check to the paying bank.27 As a result, Regulation CC required 
banks to dramatically speed up the release of funds to depositors and the return processes.28 In this 
respect, the Act protected consumers from excessive delays in payment and helped relieve the problem 
of holdover float.  
Under the federal law, the speed with which depositary banks must make funds from deposits 
available to its account holders is determined by an availability schedule that changes depending on the 
nature of the deposit and withdrawal.29 Significantly, Regulation CC’s permanent availability schedule 
does not eliminate the midnight deadline rules. Consequently, both sets of timing rules continue to co-
                                           
24 The Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4010 (1987).  
25 Id. The EFAA is found under Title IV of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987. The Act was 
enacted on August 10, 1987 and was previously known as Section 601 of title VI of the Act of August 10, 1987. 
26 See 12 C.F.R. § 229.1(b)(2)–(3)(2012). Section 229.1(b)(2) states: “Subpart B of this part contains rules 
regarding the duty of banks to make funds deposited into accounts available for withdrawals, including availability 
schedules, disclosure of funds availability policies, payment of interest, liability of banks for failure to comply with 
Subpart B of this part, and other matters.” Along the same lines, Section 229.1(b)(3) states: “Subpart C of this part 
contains rules to expedite the collection and return of checks by banks. These rules cover the direct return of checks, the 
manner in which the paying bank and the returning banks must return checks to the depositary bank, notification of 
nonpayment by the paying bank, endorsement and presentment of check, same-day settlement for certain check, the 
liability of banks for failure to comply with subpart C of this part, and other matters.” 
27 12 C.F.R. § 229 (2012). 
28 WARREN & WALT, supra note 22, at 169. 
29 See Appendix B for a chart of the availability schedules. The availability has numerous exemptions that allow 
the depositary banks to delay fund withdrawal. The situations include: new accounts where the account is open for thirty 
days or less; large deposits where deposits that aggregate more than $5,000 on one banking day; re-deposited checks 
where checks have been dishonored and a redeposit is attempted; repeated overdrafts where customer accounts are 
“repeatedly overdrawn”; “reasonable cause to doubt collectability” where “the depositary bank has reasonable cause to 
believe that the check is uncollectible”; emergency conditions where emergency conditions exist “beyond the control of 
the depositary bank, if the depositary bank exercises such diligence as the circumstances require”; “notice of exception” 
where notice is given to the customer at the time of deposit; “length of delay due to exceptions” where the bank can 
delay availability for “a reasonable period of time” of up to five business days for local checks and six days for non-local 
checks. See 12 C.F.R. § 229.13 (2012). 
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exist.30 To co-exist, banks can continue to collect checks using the interbank collections process and are 
allowed to make a decision about whether to honor a presentment before the expiration of the paying 
bank’s midnight deadline as long as they also do so before the depositary bank must make the funds 
available to the depositor in compliance with Regulation CC’s Availability Schedule.  
B.  Check 21 
In 2004, more than fifteen years after the passage of the EFAA, the second of the two major 
reforms was passed by Congress under the name, The Check Collection for the Twenty-first Century 
Act, commonly known as “Check 21.” Among other things, Check 21 empowered the Fed to 
promulgate regulations to achieve its goals. The Fed did so by adding new provisions to Regulation CC.31 
Check 21 continued to speed up the check collection process by removing two impediments that were 
unaddressed by the first set of Regulation CC’s provisions. First, Check 21 ushered in the demise of the 
requirement of privity among the collecting and paying banks. This allowed the depositary bank to 
present checks to the paying bank directly regardless of whether they were parties to a separate bank-
customer relationship. Second, Check 21 created the innovation of the “substitute check.” 
Prior to Check 21, each bank that was negotiating checks in the collections process was still 
required to have privity with the next collecting bank in the chain. Moreover, Article 3 negotiation 
required each bank to become a holder in its own right, entailing physical delivery of the original check 
each time it was transferred throughout the collection process through the time of its presentment for 
payment to the paying bank.32 Truncation was not allowed and electronic versions were allowed only 
under special arrangements.33  
Check 21, however, allows depositary banks to convert an original check into a substitute check. 
Substitute checks can travel through the check-collection system in place of the original paper check—
but they are still paper checks!34 The substitute check must be a paper reproduction of the original check 
that contains an image of the front and the back of the original paper check.35 The substitute check is 
now the legal equivalent of the original check as long as it accurately depicts the front and the back of 
the check.36 Substitute checks remain subject to U.C.C. Articles 1, 3, and 4, and other state law along 
with applicable federal law.37  
There is a widely believed misconception that Check 21 actually requires check truncation and 
the creation of a new substitute check. It does not. Rather, it provides a structure within which banks 
have the option of making speedier presentments by removing legal and logistical impediments, such as 
                                           
30 Id.; see also WARREN & WALT, supra note 22, at 168. 
31 Even though this Article criticizes the reforms for certain failures, it agrees that they were necessary and 
overdue. The Article is neither opposed to the movement to reform the check collection timing rules nor to the changes 
that they were intended to usher into place. They were overdue given the availability of technology capable of speeding 
up the process. They were necessary because banks had little or no incentive to change the pace of collections under the 
U.C.C. midnight deadline rules. There are, however, very serious, presumably unintended, consequences that can be 
traced to the new rules.  
32 U.C.C. § 3-201 (amended 2002). 
33 Andrea McGlinn, Book Note, Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act: The Impact on Consumers, 9 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 179, 180 (2005). 
34 Check 21 Implementation Video, ELECTRONIC CHECK CLEARING HOUSE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.eccho.org/history_video (last visited Dec. 2, 2012). 
35 Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act—A Wrong Turn in the Road to 
Improvement of the U.S. Payments System, 85 NEB. L. REV. 52, 84 (2006). 
36 See McGlinn, supra note 33, at 181. 
37 Id. 
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privity of contract among collecting banks and/or transporting the original check across long distances 
for collection. It simply places another arrow in the quiver of banks as they navigate the choppy waters 
between state and federal check collection timing rules. Check 21 gives collecting banks the opportunity 
to decide whether to take advantage of the federal regulations or not, depending upon their respective 
analyses of the associated costs and benefits.38 One option still available is for banks to keep processing 
checks by negotiating them through the slow interbank collection system if they wish. What depositary 
banks must do, however, is make funds available to its customers whether or not the paying bank’s 
midnight deadline has expired.  
When a substitute check is created it is still in paper form and is still an Article 3 negotiable 
instrument. Check 21 does not require banks to deal with each other directly nor to create substitute 
checks. Banks can continue to just operate as they did under Regulation CC and Article 4 using the 
movement of the original paper check through the process that they want or they can use the check 
substitution. 
C.  The Regulation CC/Check 21 Interface 
The purpose of the new regulations was to meet the Congressional objective of adding 
improvements to the check collection system by expediting the availability of funds for checking account 
customers and to ease the way for banks to use diligence to remove impediments to their ability to 
process and to pay remote collection items.39   
By making the depositary bank responsible, instead of the paying bank, the EFAA places the 
emphasis on the bank that actually controls whether or not the funds are actually made “available” to the 
depositor—the depositary bank. This highlights the greatest difference in emphasis between the EFAA 
and the U.C.C., which otherwise overlap in various respects: the EFAA limits the time that the 
depositary bank has to make the decision to allow withdrawal of funds by the person entitled to enforce 
the instrument, whereas the U.C.C. limits the time the paying bank has to make the payment decision 
based on whether the item is properly payable by the person who issued it.  
By speeding up the process, however, the EFAA exposes depositary banks to losses they did not 
face under the traditional midnight deadline regime. Specifically, banks now have much less time to make 
an informed decision about whether or not to allow customers to withdraw funds from check deposits. 
That fact increases the chances that funds associated with a check that has been dishonored will already 
have been released by a depositary bank before it receives notice of dishonor from the paying bank.  
There were good reasons for Congress to reform of the check collection system. Along with the 
entrance of Congressional intervention has been a steady increase of the Fed’s influence in the area of 
commercial regulation. The Fed, in fact, has been empowered by Congress to draft the regulations to 
accompany the new federal statutes governing check collections, beginning with Reg. CC, and continuing 
with Check 21 as well as its 2010 amendments.40  
One of the most interesting aspects of the Federal movement to reform the check collection 
system is that it has not abolished the midnight deadline rules of Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. Rather, 
the U.C.C. (which has also been revised extensively and often) has been allowed to co-exist with new 
Federal regulations despite the fact that the U.C.C. and federal reforms contain dramatically different and 
                                           
38 Felsenfeld & Bilali, supra note 35, at 91–92. 
39 12 U.S.C. § 5001 (2006). 
40 In fact, the Fed actually took the initiative to actually draft Check 21 and sent it to Congress, which 
apparently rubber-stamped it. 
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potentially inconsistent timing rules. Of course, the Federal regulations trump state law and must be 
followed by banks whether or not they continue to satisfy the U.C.C. timing rules.41 Moreover, there is 
great possibility for additional reform as technology improves because it will become more feasible to 
virtually make checks payable “on demand” as still required by both state and federal definitions. 
The reforms that sped up the availability of funds following a deposit of a check are best 
understood in context, that of a buyer/consumer who uses a check to pay for a purchase of valuable 
goods or services from a seller who is willing to wait a brief period to collect the funds from the buyer’s 
bank. The focus of the reformers was primarily on the seller’s demand rights in the instrument. Of 
course, it is the seller in the underlying commercial transaction who is entitled to payment and who has 
agreed to take a check as a substitute for money with the understanding that the buyer has sufficient 
funds on deposit at its bank at the time when the check was issued.  
The second party to the three-party bank check is the buyer or consumer in the underlying 
commercial transaction who issued the check as payment. Traditionally, rightly or wrongly, the buyer 
developed a reasonable expectation that there would be some delay before the money would be debited 
against the account from which the check was issued. Not only did these consumers expect a delay in 
payment, they perceived benefits from the delay, including continued earning of interest during the delay 
period, and continued use of funds.42  
Regulation CC and Check 21 successfully reduced bank float and expedited the availability of 
funds to sellers. However, in a significant oversight, the regulators failed to consider the impact of the 
reform rules on consumers who were accustomed to using checks to pay for their purchases. The result 
was that low-income and minority consumers were left scrambling for alternative cash management 
strategies.43 
                                           
41 The mid-1950s until 1990 used U.C.C. Article 4 and the midnight deadline rules. From 1990 to 2004, we 
have had the EFAA and Regulation CC. From 2004 to the present we have had the Check 21 Act. 
42 Jeffrey M. Lacker, The Check Float Puzzle, 83 FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. Q. 1, 1–25 (1997). 
43 See The Color of Debt: Credit Card Debt by Race and Ethnicity, DEMOS, 
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/FACTSHEET_TheColorofDebt_Demos.pdf (last visited Nov. 
25, 2012) (noting that in 2007, thirty-nine percent of minority consumers used credit cards “to pay for basic expenses” 
such as “rent, mortgage payments, groceries, utilities or insurance because they did not have enough money in their 
checking or savings account”); see also The Plastic Safety Net: Findings from the 2012 National Survey on Credit card Debt of Low 
and Middle Income Households, DEMOS, http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/PlasticSafetyNet-
Demos.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2012) (“Nearly half of young adults and forty-five percent of households earning less 
than $50,000 per year used credit cards to pay basic monthly costs like groceries and rent. Fifty-two percent of 
households with members lacking health insurance paid for necessities with credit cards.”). By contrast, fifty-four 
percent of all households surveyed in a 2007 study reported using checks to cover basic month-to-month expenses. See 
PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHAT AMERICANS PAY FOR—AND HOW (2007). This information lends itself to the inference 
that less lower-income and minority consumers are using checks for their daily expenses. Moreover, the fact that low-
income and minority consumers made the switch is not an accident. Over forty percent of households which relied on 
credit card debt for basic daily expenses such as rent did so because their checking accounts did not provide a sufficient 
financial cushion. See Demos, Plastic Safety Net. A survey of payday loan users in Texas turned up similar results regarding 
the type of expenses that the loans were used for. See Short-term Cash, Long-term Debt, Texas Appleseed, 9–12 (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.caction.org/CAN-Research/Reports/2009/Short-termCashLong-termDebt.pdf (“The majority of 
respondents need credit to cover basic recurring expenses, such as bills, food and rent, or mortgage payments.”); see also 
PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHO BORROWS, WHERE THEY BORROW, AND WHY (2012) (2012 survey of consumers finding 
that sixty-nine percent used payday loans to cover recurring household expenses). In one survey, respondents’ answers 
were particularly revealing. The respondents, explaining how they used payday loans for recurring expenses, stated: 
 
Male borrower, Chicago: 
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IV. CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL REGULATORY REFORM  
Although it was undoubtedly prudent for the Fed to take steps to reduce the inflationary effect 
that the traditional checking system had on the monetary system, in so doing it triggered a concomitant 
negative economic impact on consumers.44 There were, in fact, some fears expressed prior to the passage 
                                                                                                                                         
“Just need to get to the next paycheck.  And I need, you know, either pay the bill to keep the lights 
on, or need some food, or whatever it is.” 
 
Female borrower, San Francisco: 
“If I have bills to pay, or say I need food on the table, I am going.” 
 
Male borrower, San Francisco: 
“Well, I was a little short and was thinking I could use some more money and I was at the ATM 
actually, and it was there, offering me a direct deposit advance. So, I thought I would try it.”  
 
44 See FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, Float, supra note 20. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
described the float problem as follows:  
For several reasons, float increased sharply in the 1970s. One was that the volume of checks 
processed by the Federal Reserve doubled during the decade, increasing holdover float. Also, high 
inflation meant that the average dollar amount of check increased. Finally, high inflation, coupled with 
high interest rates, provided an incentive for large companies to draw funds from far-away banks to 
try to benefit from transportation float. The practice of drawing funds from far-away banks was 
known as "remote disbursement."  
The Federal Reserve took action in 1973 to reduce transportation float by establishing new 
regional check-processing facilities throughout the Federal Reserve System. In addition, efficiency in 
the use of air charter service was improved. These measures helped reduce float from a daily average 
of $2.7 billion in 1973 to a daily average of $2.1 billion in 1975. However, between 1975 and 1979, 
float more than tripled (in nominal terms) to a daily average of $6.6 billion, an all-time high. The 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System believed that transportation float caused by 
remote disbursement had become a serious problem, and issued a policy statement in early 1979 to 
discourage the practice.  
As part of the Monetary Control Act of 1980s, the Federal Reserve System was instructed to 
charge banks for float. As a result of this legislation and greatly improved check processing efficiency, 
float was reduced to a daily average of $2.5 billion in 1982, down about 60 percent (in nominal terms) 
from the 1979 level. To reduce float further, the Federal Reserve implemented procedural changes in 
the 1980s. Among these changes was the establishment of a nationwide noon-presentment policy in 
1983 that allowed later delivery of checks to banks in cities with Federal Reserve check-processing 
offices. This policy also applied to high-volume institutions in more remote areas that had access to 
regional check processing centers. These actions significantly increased the number of checks that 
could be collected overnight, speeding the clearing process and reducing float. By 1985, float was 
reduced to a daily average of $820 million, down almost 90 percent from its 1979 level. The amount 
of float averaged $860 million through the rest of the 1980s. 
Developments in the 1990s 
In the 1990s, float has decreased further. One reason is that fewer paper checks are being sent to the 
Federal Reserve, reducing holdover float. The number of checks processed by the Federal Reserve 
decreased from 19 to 15.5 billion between 1993 and 1995. The number of checks processed in the 
United States continues to decrease, due largely to the rapid growth in electronic payments. For 
example, many employers now offer direct deposit of paychecks to their employees, speeding 
payment and reducing float. 
Also, the Federal Reserve has been installing new technology since the 1980s to reduce 
transportation float. Instead of having their accounts debited upon the physical return of checks, 
paying banks have the option of having their checks scanned and converted into electronic 
presentments at the Federal Reserve. The electronic presentments are transmitted from the Federal 
Reserve to the paying banks, and accounts are debited more quickly. The Federal Reserve is 
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of Check 21 about the potential dangers that it would pose for consumers.45 One such fear was that the 
loss of float would result in more returned checks and thus more overdraft fees. It was estimated that by 
mid-2005, consumers could be bouncing seven million more checks and paying $170 million more in 
fees.46 A survey suggested eight percent of consumers wrote checks “because they like the float.”47 This 
data suggested that consumers liked float just as much as the banks did.  
The recent growth in risky behavior among consumers is confirmation of the dangers associated 
with the loss of float that was in the system prior to the enactment of Check 21 and the Regulation CC. 
News coverage during the economic downturn beginning in 2008 brings this mind as much has been 
made in the media of the dramatic increases in unaffordable mortgage debt, payday loans, and other high 
risk behaviors that consumers have been undertaking.  
The primary thesis of this Article is that many of these risky behaviors are the result of 
Regulation CC. Upon losing the time previously built into the cumbersome and slow check collection 
process, consumers—especially those who had fewer viable alternatives—began seeking alternative 
sources of cash to address the impact of the loss of check transaction float on their ability to manage 
their scarce cash resources. These alternative sources are more expensive and thus detrimental to poor 
minority consumers eliminating the relative windfall they enjoyed as a result of the “transaction” float 
that was built into the old system.  
There is little doubt that the primary motive for federal pre-emption of traditional state 
governance of the check collection process was, at some level, to protect consumers.48 But the reforms 
are problematic because they addressed a problem by using an approach that failed to anticipate the 
pressure they would place on consumers to seek alternative ways to manage their cash. In particular, the 
reforms reflect an apparent failure on the part of both Congress and the Federal Reserve Governing 
Board to fully consider all of the implications of speeding up the check collection timing rules.  
Certainly, there is no evidence that any affirmative steps were taken by either Congress or the 
Fed to more completely protect consumers with easy access to a mainstream alternative to replace the 
old slow-to-be-collected check. Consumers prefer and need a check that is collected more slowly than 
their traditional demand instruments are currently being collected under the new, faster availability 
schedules. 
By removing all float, the federal regulators left consumers to their own devices to replace the 
element of time they once enjoyed under the old timing rules—and upon which they had heavily relied 
in their cash management calculus. Since the enactment of Regulation CC and the expedited availability 
schedules, consumers facing shrinking windows of time during which they can obtain funds to cover 
their checks have turned to three main alternative cash management sources: payday loans, credit cards, 
                                                                                                                                         
continuing to investigate and implement new methods to speed the check-clearing process. As a 
result, float averaged only $774 million in 2000, and it will likely decrease even further as technology 
advances. 
45 Paul Katzeff, Bank “Float” is Set to Fade-Out, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Oct. 11, 2004, at A14; McGlinn, supra 
note 34, at 179; see generally Mark E. Budnitz, The Check 21 Challenge: Will Banks Take Advantage of Consumers, 58 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 369 (2004).  
46 See “Check 21” Law Benefits Banks But Will Mean More Bounced Checks & Fees for Consumers, CONSUMERS UNION 
(Aug. 24, 2004), http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_financial_services/001332.html. 
47 See McGlinn, supra note 33, at 194. 
48 See Frequently Asked Questions About Check 21, FED. RESERVE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 
www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/check21_faq.htm# (last updated May 1, 2012). 
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and HELOCs. All of these alternatives were more expensive than their checks and deleterious to the 
economic well-being of the poorest, most vulnerable of all checking account customers. 
Timeline data seem to indicate a relationship, between the enactment of the first of these federal 
reforms and the increase in the appetite for risk by consumers and consumption for financial products 
that allow them to leverage their current income, and thus, to manage their cash in order to make small 
dollar purchases. One compelling example of the temporal connection between the reforms in check 
collection timing rules and increases in the amount of risk-laden behaviors by consumers to make small 
dollar amount purchases is to look at the significant growth of the payday loan industry in the U.S. since 
1990—the year the EFAA went into effect. There are also surprising data about the increasing use of 
credit card debt and home equity lines of credit (“HELOCs”) in the same period.  
A.  Payday Loans 
 The most insidious risky practice that consumers have turned to following the 1990 rule changes 
is the use of payday loans. Much has been written about the payday loan industry in legal and economic 
journals, and newspapers since the mid-1990s. This scholarship falls into three main categories: articles 
that attempt to describe the industry itself, articles that discuss who payday loan customers are, and 
articles that try to propose solutions.49 My treatment of the payday lending industry proceeds in three 
steps: first, I provide a brief history of payday lending, including a discussion of lending practices and 
industry trends since 1990. Second, I discuss how the payday lending industry has affected minority 
communities. Finally, I discuss broadly the deceptive nature of payday loans. 
1.  A Short History of Payday Lending 
The modern U.S. payday lending industry can trace its roots back to early twentieth century 
salary buyers,50 who offered to purchase someone’s paycheck in advance and for a discount.51 These 
salary buyers operated the early payday loan stores in order to meet the demand of a growing market of 
people, especially immigrants and migrants from rural to urban areas. Their customers were typically 
poor working-class people who had current supplemental cash needs but who were unable to qualify for 
small dollar amount short-term loans from banks because they were considered too risky. The payday 
lending industry began growing exponentially in the 1980s. This expansion is attributable to two factors: 
deregulation of the banking industry and a lack of short-term loan providers. The impact of deregulation 
was that interest rate caps imposed on lenders were removed. The retraction of mainstream, short-term 
loans meant that fewer such loans were provided, forcing consumers to turn elsewhere to satisfy those 
                                           
49 For a non-exhaustive list of articles providing treatment on the topic of payday lending, see, e.g., Nathalie 
Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563 
(2010); CHRIS GIANGRECO, ANDREA KOVACH, & MATT UNRATH, ALTERNATIVE SMALL DOLLAR LOANS: BUILDING 
THE BUSINESS CASE, 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.illinoisassetbuilding.org/sites/default/files/Alt%20Small%20Dollar%20Loans%20Report%20v2.pdf; 
PAIGE MARTI SKIBA & JEREMY TOBACMAN, DO PAYDAY LOANS CAUSE BANKRUPTCY? (2009); Mary Spector, Taming the 
Beast: Payday Loans, Regulatory Efforts, and Unintended Consequences, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 961 (2008); Ronald J. Mann & Jim 
Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855 (2007); Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending 
and the Military: The Law and Geography of "Payday" Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653 (2005); Creola Johnson, 
Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
50 One scholar has even traced the origins of the payday lending industry back to biblical times. See Spector, 
supra note 49, at 969. Interestingly, in the same passage, Spector notes that since Biblical times as well, efforts to regulate 
payday lending could be frustrated by intricately designed lending systems. See id.  
51 Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices Necessarily Mean Outrageous Profits?, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 203, 204 (2007). 
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financial needs.52 By the 1990s, numerous check cashing stores opened. These stores worked solely on 
cashing checks.53 The transition to lending against future checks was a natural next step for businesses 
that started out by cashing checks during better times.54 
 In a typical payday loan transaction, the borrower tenders a post-dated check and proof of 
employment to the lender for the amount of the loan, plus a fee.55 The lender then gives the borrower 
the loan amount, minus the amount of the fee.56 The lender will also generally agree to retain the check 
until the date when the borrower’s loan matures.57 This time period is generally fast approaching, 
typically falling on the borrower’s next payday.58 Alternatively (and commonly), the borrower can choose 
to refinance the amount of the loan for an additional two weeks if the borrower pays a refinancing fee.  
 The process for obtaining a payday loan is decidedly less rigorous than the application process 
for a loan from a mainstream financial institution. A payday loan applicant needs only to show that she 
has a bank account and that she is currently employed.59 
In 1990, Regulation CC went into effect and ushered in the new availability schedules that 
reduced, if not eliminated the float period for consumers when they issued checks. This new norm also 
meant that consumers were presented with a new dilemma. On the one hand, they could continue 
writing checks just as they had before the reforms were instituted. However, doing so carried the real risk 
of bouncing checks more frequently as they were presented for payment before the funds were on 
deposit to cover them, leading to high returned check fees, potential social stigma, inability to access 
other banking services due to being seen as a credit risk, and the long-term effects of a poor credit 
history.60 On the other hand, consumers could avoid the new fast checks by taking advantage of the 
ability to obtain cash by borrowing against their next paycheck through a new arrival on the cash 
management scene: the payday loan. Historical data show that consumers overwhelmingly chose this 
new option over the option of writing checks and incurring the risks associated with returned checks.  
                                           
52 Id. at 205. 
53 DONALD P. MORGAN & MICHAEL R. STRAIN, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, PAYDAY HOLIDAY: 
HOW HOUSEHOLDS FARE AFTER PAYDAY CREDIT BANS 9 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1032621.  
54 Id. 
55 See Payday Loans Equal Very Costly Cash: Consumers Urged to Consider the Alternatives, FED. TRADE COMMISSION 
(Mar. 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt060.shtm. The typical size of a payday loan is 
between $200 and $300, plus whatever finance charge the lender applies. See CONSUMER CREDIT RESEARCH 
FOUNDATION, THE PAYDAY LENDING FACTBOOK 2 (Dec. 2004). 
56 See Payday Loans Equal Very Costly Cash, supra note 55.  
57 Id.  
58 Id. 
59 See CONSUMER CREDIT RESEARCH FOUNDATION, supra note 55 (“The borrower presents identification 
(typically two forms, one with a photograph), the most recent bank statement, and the latest pay stub; all are typically 
required to obtain a loan. . .”). 
60 See, e.g., PEW HEALTH TRUST, UNBANKED BY CHOICE: A LOOK AT HOW LOW-INCOME LOS ANGELES 
HOUSEHOLDS MANAGE THE MONEY THEY EARN 11 (2010) (finding forty-four percent of banking customers were 
charged late fee, and eighteen percent of low-income customers in economically distressed neighborhoods of Los 
Angeles incurred late fee charges on their checking accounts). A similar trend in credit card late fees and rate hikes 
resulting from late payments prompted a Congressional response. See, e.g., The Credit Act: It’s Working, DEMOS, 
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Credit%20Card%20Act%20Successes%20-%20Demos.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2012). Specifically, DEMOS found that in 2008, fifty-two percent of credit card holders 
experienced a late fee, and fifty-three percent experienced a rate hike, as a result of missing a payment. Id. In 2012, after 
passage of the Card Act, which required that card issuers wait at least twenty-one days after a delinquent payment before 
charging a late fee or exacting a rate hike, instances of consumers experiencing late fees and rate hikes fell to twenty-
eight and twenty-nine percent, respectively. Id.  
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The data referenced above is exclusively temporal, measuring the number of payday loan shops 
in existence after the check clearing reforms went into effect. Following those reforms, the number of 
payday loan shops, and consumer demand for payday loans, experienced unprecedented growth.61 
Specifically, consumers have increasingly sought short-term bridge loans secured by their next paycheck 
as a way of meeting very short-term cash shortages needed to pay for routine household purchases. This 
rise in use of payday loans has closely tracked a corresponding decline in the use of checks.62 Below is a 
chart illustrating this temporal data. 
Payday lenders appear to have grasped what banks have not: that consumers enjoy and need a 
replacement for float in their short-term cash management options. Further, as is common knowledge, 
the average American worker is customarily paid bi-weekly. This is close to the average length of time it 
traditionally would take to present and pay a check prior to the reforms. Check use, which still remains 
the leading method of payment behind cash, has continued to decline while the number of payday stores 
increased by more than 4800% as of 1997 in the years following the introduction of Reg. CC.63 From 
                                           
61 See CPSS–Red Book Statistical Update, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Apr. 2003) 
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss54p2.pdf; CPSS–Red Book Statistical Update, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Mar. 2008) 
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss82p2.pdf; CPSS–Red Book Statistical Update, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Sept. 2012) 
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss104.pdf; Profiting from Poverty, NAT’L PEOPLE’S ACTION (Jan. 2012) http://www.npa-
us.org/files/profiting_from_poverty_npa_payday_loan_report_jan_2012_0.pdf; see also Robin A. Prager, Determinants of 
Locations of Payday Lenders, Pawnshops, and Check-Cashing Outlets, FED. RESERVE BOARD (Jun. 2009), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200933/200933pap.pdf.   
Year Total Number of 
Transactions by Check (Millions) 
Payday Loan Stores 
(Thousands) 
1997 46,569.4 Approximately 2000 
1998 45169.7 Approximately 5000 
1999 43,812.1 Approximately 6000 
2000 42,500 Approximately 8500 
2001 41,222.6 Approximately 12000 
2002 38,821.2 Approximately 14000 
2003 37.281.9 Approximately 20000 
2004 35,040.4 Approximately 21,000 
2005 32,798.9 Approximately 22000 
2006 30,557.4 Approximately 23,000 
2007 27,955.4 Approximately 24500 
2008 26,054.2 Approximately 24500 
2009 24,464.9 Approximately 23000 
2010 22,838.6 Approximately 19700 
2011 21,276.9 Approximately 20000 
 
The decline in payday lending stores which began around 2007 is attributable in part to increased regulation of payday 
lending in some states. 
62 There are very few alternatives to short term bridge loans. The examples commonly mentioned include pawn 
shops, loan sharks, and title loans. See Charles A. Bruch, Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans, 69 U. CIN L. REV. 1257, 
1268–69 (2001). In addition, the FDIC has implemented a small-loan pilot program among thirty-one banks nationally. 
Each of the banks agrees to make small loans and do not charge significant fees or interest. The borrower also has a 
longer amount of time to repay the loans up to three years. However, it is unclear whether or not this program will 
succeed in impacting payday lenders. A spokesperson for the payday loan industry notes that their customers are not 
likely to visit banks because “banks look down on our customers.” It was also noted that many low and moderate 
income customers do not use banks because of the way they are treated. See Mark Davis, Banks Test Small-Loan Program, 
KANSAS CITY STAR, May 11, 2008, at D1.  
63 FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, THE 2007 FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY (2007), available at 
http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/research/2007_payments_study.pdf. 
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this, it appears that consumers have turned to payday loans as a favorite way to replace the cash 
management function of float. The role of the payday loan as a cash management tool as opposed to a 
typical loan is borne out by the data that show that most payday loan store customers are repeat 
borrowers, taking out eight to twelve loans per year.64  
Consumer dependence on payday lenders has been exacerbated by the fact that banks have been 
reluctant to enter into the small-short-term-loan business.65 This reluctance can be traced to three related 
concerns. First, there is a large concern over the profitability over offering relatively low-interest loans. 
Many bank officials actually acknowledge that they believe offering payday loan-like products will be 
profitable only if they charge high interest rates. There are also concerns over the reputation of banks 
among a broad customer base if they become infected with the same taint that is attached to payday 
loans operators. A related concern is that offering a service similar to payday loans could come with 
tremendous amounts of criticism from “media, public policy officials, and consumer advocates.”66 
 It has been estimated that ten million households borrow from a payday store every year.67 
Examination of the demographics of payday loan users reveals the depth of the problems they cause. 
According to the demographic data, the typical payday loan customer is forty years old and earns 
between $30,000 and $40,000 annually. Half of all customers have an average annual income of between 
$25,000 and $50,000.68 Twenty percent have college diplomas and more than half have completed some 
college, and ninety-four percent have a high school diploma.  
 Even more troubling is the fact that payday loan customers are disproportionately drawn from 
politically and economically disadvantaged groups: racial minorities, women and military families who are 
deliberately targeted by payday loan operators.69  
 A 2011 study of the concentration of payday lending operations in several states found that 
In North Carolina, three times as many payday lenders per capita are present in African 
American neighborhoods as in White neighborhoods. In the state of Washington . . . 
they are twice as likely to be located in predominantly African American as White areas, 
and they also are concentrated in poverty zip codes. In California, they are eight times as 
concentrated in African American and Latino neighborhoods as in White 
neighborhoods. Even controlling on income, poverty, population, education, and other 
socioeconomic factors, the racial disparity persists. In Denver neighborhoods where the 
median income is below $30,000, one check-casher exists for every 3,196 residents 
                                           
64 Richard J. Thomas, Note: Rolling Over Borrowers: Preventing Excessive Refinancing and other Necessary Changes in the 
Payday Loan Industry, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2401, 2403 (2007). 
65 Some banks have begun to enter the market, but have only been doing so since around 2007. See Jim 
Puzzanghera Credit Unions, Banks Grabbing a Share of Payday Loan Dollars, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/11/business/la-fi-banks-payday-loans-20120311. 
66 THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, LOW-COST PAYDAY LOANS: OPPORTUNITIES & OBSTACLES 10 (2005). 
67 Paige Merta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loans, Uncertainty, and Discounting: Explaining Patterns of 
Borrowing, Repayment and Default, BERKELEY MIMEO (2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1319751. 
68 GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, MCDONOUGH SCHOOL 
OF BUSINESS, GEORGETOWN UNIV., PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND 
28 (2001), available at http://faculty.msb.edu/prog/CRC/pdf/Mono35.pdf.  
69 Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 67. 
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compared with one check casher for every 27,416 residents in neighborhoods where the 
median income is between $90,000 and $120,000.70 
Given those data, the usage rates among minority groups are hardly surprising. One 2009 survey of 
payday loan customers in Texas found that fifty-nine percent of borrowers were women, and forty 
percent were single women.71 The same study found that forty-four percent of borrowers were Latino, 
while thirty percent were African American.72 A separate study conducted in 2012 found that African 
Americans were twice as likely to have used payday loans, despite their considerably smaller segment of 
the population.73 That study found that, overall, African Americans constituted twenty-three percent of 
payday loan users, while comprising only twelve percent of the population.74 Latinos, while comprising 
sixteen percent of the population, constituted fourteen percent of payday loan users.75 Sadly, military 
personnel and their families are also frequent targets, and users, of payday loans.76  
2. The Disproportionate Impact of Payday Lending on Minority 
Communities 
That payday loan customers are drawn disproportionately from minority groups is not an 
accident. In 2007, Bill Harrod, a former manager at an Ohio-based payday lending store, resigned his 
position “as a matter of conscience.”77 Mr. Harrod’s conscience was offended by the fact that his 
employer, Check N’ Go, had instructed him to target his marketing towards African American 
communities, despite the potential to market their services in more diverse areas.78 He was even 
instructed to focus his efforts to market their lending services sourced in Ohio to black communities in 
Maryland, a state where such loans were prohibited.79 As described by Mr. Harrod, the industry’s deceit 
of the African American community was deliberate and recognized no boundaries of decency and fair 
dealing: 
I was instructed to start attending services at Unity Baptist Church—neither my bosses 
nor the lobbyists could do this because they were not black—to gain favor with the 
minister there and convince him to support us publicly. I was instructed by my boss to 
offer the church $800 to send several children to summer camp in return for the pastor 
testifying against . . . on reducing payday loan interest rates. I did this. But in the end, the 
minister walked out of the Council chamber without testifying because he was 
embarrassed at what he had been asked to do. I was told to pressure him to go back into 
the room, but he wouldn’t do it.80    
                                           
70 Charis E. Kubrin et al., Does Fringe Banking Exacerbate Neighborhood Crime Rates? Investigating the Social Ecology of 
Payday Lending, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 439 (2011). 
71 Short-Term Cash, Long-Term Debt, supra note 43, at 15. 
72 Id. at 16.  
73 WHO BORROWS, WHERE THEY BORROW, AND WHY, supra note 43, at 13. 
74 Id. at 35.  
75 Id; see also Kubrin et al., supra note 70. 
76 See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law and 
Geography of "Payday" Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653 (2005). 
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 On this point, Professor Creola Johnson has identified four advertising and marketing ploys that 
lenders use to victimize communities of color.81 First, lenders frequently employ African American 
celebrities to establish trust and rapport with the community they are targeting.82 Second, lenders target 
African American communities by partnering with leaders in the African American community, 
including local church leaders. Third, lenders hire minorities into sales positions for the purpose of 
soliciting business in the local minority community, as was the case with Mr. Harrod.83 Fourth, lenders 
design marketing content that combines racial and religious imagery in order to appeal to faith-based 
minority targets.84 
  As a result of the advertising and business tactics of the payday lending industry, payday lending 
stores are more likely to be situated in areas with large minority populations,85 and thus payday loan 
customers are more likely to be minorities.86 Due to the nature of payday loans, the eventual negative 
effect is that minorities are ultimately more likely to become trapped in a vicious cycle involving payday 
loan debt than non-minorities.87  
 Of course, concerns about poverty and economic development have long been of prime 
importance to African American communities, the intransigence of which have been vexing to 
generations of community activists who have worked tirelessly to address these concerns.88 In the 
aggregate, payday loans damage communities by perpetuating the continuation of a cycle of poverty, 
luring people to borrow money against their future salaries just to pay for current every day needs for 
their households. One study of payday lending practices in California found that payday loan operators 
sapped $247 million in fees annually from primarily minority communities.89 Another study, conducted 
across multiple states and regions, found that payday loans extracted $3.1 billion in fees from borrowers, 
many of whom are minority or lower-income consumers.90 Without financial resources, it is nearly 
impossible to reinvigorate a community. For instance, without a reliable customer base, businesses will 
not want to move to a particular community. On a macro level, payday loans therefore reduce the overall 
financial well-being of minority communities, thereby retarding economic development and postponing 
social justice.  
  3.  Payday Lending and Bankruptcy 
                                           
81 See Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory Lenders Use Minorities to Target Communities of Color, 
17 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL'Y 165, 168 (2010). 
82 Id. at 171.  
83 Johnson, supra note 81, at 174–75. 
84 Id. at 175–76. 
85 Id.   
86 Id.  
87 See Johnson, supra note 81, at 186–88.  
88 See, e.g., ETHAN COHEN-COLE, CREDIT CARD REDLINING (2009) (describing “disinvestment” in urban areas 
dating back to World War II and discrimination in access to credit as contributing to the “economic malaise” which now 
faces many minority population centers across the country). This issue can be traced as far back as the end of the Civil 
War and Reconstruction. It was during this time that America first faced problems of viability relating to African 
Americans on a grand scale. See, e.g., The Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (establishing 
Freedmen’s Bureau during Reconstruction era). As anyone who has driven through the inner city of any major American 
metropolis knows, it is a problem which has not been answered adequately, and which is only exacerbated when 
financial institutions deviously swindle millions of dollars from those communities.  
89 Wei Li et al., Predatory Profiling: The Role of Race and Ethnicity in the Location of Payday Lenders in California, 
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/california/ca-
payday/research-analysis/predatory-profiling.pdf.  
90 Profiting from Poverty, NAT’L PEOPLE’S ACTION (Jan. 2012), http://www.npa-
us.org/files/profiting_from_poverty_npa_payday_loan_report_jan_2012_0.pdf. 
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Another major problem with payday loans is that they are deceptive. Payday lenders frequently 
advertise their loan products as “short-term,”91 yet it is clear that this cannot possibly be the case. 
Cameron Blakely, a former manager of a payday lender in Washington, D.C., explained how his 
employer profited from its payday loan business: 
The secret to the success of the payday loan is its deceptive design. Specifically, we made 
the process very simple and easy at the front end to get people into the loan. But at the 
back end, we made it very difficult for customers to get out of the loan. It became a 
situation where our borrowers were like indentured servants, but with indefinite terms of 
servitude. They would work and work. But each payday, we’d claim a piece of their 
paycheck. Every paycheck. Not only was it hard to escape, but most of our customers 
were not fully aware of the desperate situations they were in. They were so confused that 
sometimes they would say that they just couldn’t live without that extra payday loan cash 
coming in—when, in reality, they were not getting any more money out of the loan. 
Instead, they were paying money to us in fees over and over again. And that is what was 
making their paychecks even shorter than usual.92 
 Consumers get trapped in a debt cycle using payday loans in many ways. One way, of course, is a 
simple inability to repay the loan. At the other end of the spectrum is the situation caused by payday 
lenders who fail to explain to borrowers the consequences of making only minimum payments—namely 
that minimum required interest-only payments will not ever pay down the principal outstanding on the 
loan.93 In this manner, payday lenders deceive consumers into believing they are paying off their loans 
when in reality they are not.  
 There is also a body of scholarship that suggests that payday loan borrowers have a higher than 
average likelihood of filing a personal bankruptcy. A 2001 study found that that 15.4% of payday loan 
users had filed a bankruptcy petition.94 During the same survey period, only 3.7% of the total adult 
population had filed bankruptcy petitions.95 Moreover, sixty percent of payday loan customers had also 
maxed out their credit cards.96 Another study of bankruptcy petitions in New Mexico found that 
eighteen percent of individuals filing bankruptcy petitions had used payday loans.97 These studies only 
establish correlation, and therefore standing alone do not support the proposition that payday loans 
cause bankruptcy. It is possible that some of these data capture consumers who were well on the way 
towards bankruptcy petition before ever taking out a payday loan and may have even postponed the 
                                           
91 See How it Works, CASHNETUSA, http://www.cashnetusa.com/how-it-works.html (last visited Nov. 2012) 
(describing payday loan as “ short-term loans with a small dollar amount that are usually repaid upon your next 
payday.”). 
92 Press Release, Ohio Coalition, supra note 77, at 3. Using tactics like this, Mr. Blakely’s employer managed to 
extract nearly $15,000 in fees to service a loan for $900. That $15,000 represents an opportunity cost between servicing 
fees and everything else a consumer may spend money on. In other words, the servicing fees which payday lenders 
extract from consumers is money which otherwise could have been spent on goods and services which the consumer 
actually wants. This may seem trivial when only discussing a single consumer, but payday lending is a multi-billion dollar 
industry, and these fees are the only profit center for the industry. In this regard, the consumer protection issues I have 
been discussing tie directly into concerns over the national economy. It is difficult to imagine a productive economy in 
which consumers spend all their money servicing loans.  
93 Nathalie Martin, supra note 49, at 599. 
94 ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 68. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. 
97 Nathalie Martin & Koo Im Tong, Double Down and Out: The Connection Between Payday Loans and 
Bankruptcy, 39 SW. L. REV. 785, 803 (2010). 
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bankruptcy because of the payday loan’s usefulness as a last resort. Still, there appears to be a strong 
inference that payday loans increase the likelihood of future bankruptcies. This is especially true given 
the evidence that suggests that the payday loan industry preys on financially distressed individuals.  
B.  Credit Cards 
Credit card usage has increased substantially since the 1990 reforms, despite only moderate 
increases in the number of credit card users. There are data, along with anecdotal evidence compiled in 
other studies that suggest that credit cards have become an increasingly important cash management tool 
following the 1990 check collection reforms.  
In 1990, there were 122 million cardholders in the United States and 1.012 billion cards in 
circulation.98 Credit transactions were valued at $466 billion, and outstanding consumer credit card debt 
was $243 billion.99 In 1997, outstanding credit card debt was approximately $526 billion.100 Three years 
later, in 2000, there were 159 million credit card holders and 1.425 billion credit cards in circulation;101 
credit card purchases totaled $1.242 trillion, and the total outstanding debt was $680 billion.102 Eight 
years after that, in 2008, there were 176 million card holders and 1.493 billion credit cards in 
circulation;103 credit card purchases totaled $2.153 trillion, and outstanding consumer debt stood at $976 
billion.104 The Census Bureau projects that for 2011 there were 183 million people with credit cards and 
1.278 billion credit cards in circulation.105 The Bureau further estimates that credit transactions for 2011 
totaled $2.044 trillion, and total consumer outstanding debt was $897 billion.106 
Though I ultimately conclude that credit card use is a significant problem for consumers (and 
minorities in particular), I also recognize that credit cards do provide some important benefits for 
consumers. First, for many consumers, credit cards may be the only available source of credit.107 Also, 
credit cards allow consumers greater cash management flexibility because the ability to use credit is less 
tied to receiving a paycheck than payday loans or cash.108 
Despite these possible benefits, credit cards also pose significant problems for consumers. First, 
credit card agreements are quintessential adhesion contracts in which the consumer’s only role in the 
                                           
98 Banking Finance and Insurance, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/01statab/banking.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2012)  
99 Id. 
100 Legislative Update, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/PrinterTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDis
play.cfm&CONTENTID=53197 (last visited Dec. 9, 2012). 
101 Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 





106 Id. The Census Bureau estimates that there will be 160 million cardholders for 2012, and outstanding 
consumer credit debt will fall to $870 billion. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1188.pdf. 
107 See David S. Evans, The Growth and Diffusion of Credit Cards in Society, 2 PAYMENT CARD ECON. REV. 59, 64 
(2004). Often other types of unsecured loans are difficult to obtain since the lender has to rely entirely on the predicated 
ability of the borrower to pay instead of securing additional collateral. 
108 Id. 
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contractual process is to accept or decline the terms as offered.109 The fear that credit card companies 
will use this imbalance in bargaining power to their advantage is not merely conjectural: scholars and 
lawmakers have already identified several ways in which credit companies insert one-sided, adhesive 
terms into their agreements, often to the detriment of consumers.110 Among others, these include 
provisions that allow the credit card company to alter the terms of the agreement at any time for any 
reason or that allow them to assess unreasonable penalty fees.111 Inclusion of such terms make credit 
cards a risky cash management solution because the credit card debtor is in a considerably inferior 
position to that of the lender, which is both more sophisticated economically and holds a superior 
relative position in all negotiations.112 Subsequently, in May of 2009, credit card reform legislation passed 
that greatly limited: a) the card companies’ ability to change individual interest rates (requires 45 day 
advance notice); b) who can receive a credit card (individuals under 21 must prove that they can repay 
the money or a parent will pay); and c) how much time people have to pay their bills.113 
The consumer risk associated with large credit card debt was amplified by amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code passed by Congress in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005 (hereafter “BAPCPA”). Ostensibly, the purpose of BAPCPA was to “improve bankruptcy 
law and practice by restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure 
that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors.”114 Congress passed BAPCPA in response to 
lobbying efforts by the credit and financial sectors feeling that many consumers were spending recklessly 
and then taking advantage of lax bankruptcy rules to escape their debt obligations.115 The 2005 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code specifically targeted consumer bankruptcy filings in order to 
reduce the losses incurred by the credit industry as a result of the ability of credit card holders to 
discharge their debts in Chapter seven proceedings.116 Following the amendments, bankruptcy is a less 
viable option for many consumers, meaning that credit card debt is considerably more likely to become 
permanent.117   
When race is factored into the equation, the problems associated with credit cards are 
exacerbated. Traditionally, minority access to credit was well below that of whites.118 When minorities 
are offered credit card agreements, they are frequently on less favorable terms than white customers 
receive.119 Specifically, poor and minority customers were found by one recent study to be more likely to 
                                           
109 See Eric A. Zacks, Unstacking the Deck? Contract Manipulation and Credit Card Accountability, 78 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (2010); Mo Zhang, Contractual Choice of Law in Contracts of Adhesion and Party 
Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 123, 123–24 (2008). 
110 See Zacks, supra note 109, at 1477–78.  
111 Id. 
112 This imbalance of bargaining strength and susceptibility to fraud were one of the things which motivated 
Congress to pass the CARD Act in 2009. The CARD Act requires, inter alia, that credit card companies maintain interest 
rates as stated in the initial contract for one year, and that 45 days written notice be given if a company wishes to 
increase a cardholder’s interest rate or fees. New Credit Card Rules Effective Feb. 22, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, 
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115 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, CCHGROUP (Apr. 21, 2005), 
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119 Id. (characterizing credit agreements offered to minorities following deregulation of credit industry as 
“economically detrimental.”). See also Jennifer Wheary & Tamara Draut, Who Pays? Winners and Losers of Credit Card 
Deregulation, DEMOS, 1, http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/whopays_Demos.pdf (last visited Nov. 
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pay greater than twenty percent interest on their credit card bills,120 and twice as many African 
Americans paid twenty percent or greater interest than whites.121  
 All things considered, it is not surprising that more minorities default on their credit card bills.122 
Such defaults can have terrible consequences for a consumer. When a consumer defaults on a bill, it 
adversely affects her credit rating and the all-important credit score—both of which can lead to fewer 
future borrowing opportunities and perpetuation of the cycle of poverty.123 That, in turn, can make it 
difficult to obtain additional credit.124 When additional credit is available at all, it is often at even higher 
interest rates.125 That leads to a potential debt cycle, and due to BAPCPA, that debt is increasingly 
difficult to discharge. A poor credit rating can also negatively affect current and future job prospects.  
C.  Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs)   
HELOCs are a form of credit that is tied to the equity a consumer has in his or her home, and 
which collateralizes the consumer’s home as security for the instrument.126 In 1991, 282,000 U.S. 
households had a home equity loan. This number increased at a gradual pace until 1997.127 In 1997, the 
number of HELOCs totaled 433,000,128 and in 1998, this number increased substantially to 753,000. By 
2000, there were 1,272,000 households with HELOCs.129 Industry sources estimated that by early 2010 
there were 5.4 million HELOCs.130 HELOCs were preferred by consumers because they were a more 
affordable type of credit than credit cards.131  
Like the other forms of credit discussed in this article, however, HELOCs pose substantial risks 
to consumers which render them less than ideal cash management devices.132 There is evidence that, 
over time, creditors offering HELOCs have been engaging in predatory conduct. Specifically, the main 
predatory practice that HELOC lenders use is the offering of credit itself, specifically offering a HELOC 
to homeowners who cannot be reasonably expected to repay the loan.133 Lenders encourage consumers 
to take out HELOCs using several strategies. Some lenders, for instance, instruct consumers to lie on 
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123 The Plastic Safety, DEMOS, http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/PlasticSafetyNet-
Demos.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2012). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Home Equity Lines of Credit: Who Uses Them?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 2007), 
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the Ownership Society: A Case Study on the Economic Impact of Property Rights, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 59, 75 (2007) (describing 2001 
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133 Id; see Putting Your Home on the Loan Line is Risky Business, FED. RESERVE BOARD (Apr. 8, 2008), 
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their applications about how much they earn, thereby increasing their rates of approval.134 Other lenders 
advise homeowners to convert their current mortgages into new, longer term mortgages without 
explaining the total amount by which principal debt will increase over the life of the loan.135 Still, other 
lenders offer consumers a HELOC based on an inflated value of the home and/or the amount of the 
consumer’s equity.136 This is especially risky after the housing bubble burst because home prices have 
decreased dramatically, making it more difficult for consumers to recoup the value of their home or to 
maintain the ratio of loan to equity that the loan agreement may require.137  
Banks are aggressive about protecting themselves against the risks associated with HELOCs. 
During the 2008 housing bubble, as home prices fell and home equity levels declined, many banks froze 
or reduced their HELOC lines.138 This means that consumers who depended on HELOCs as ax cash 
management strategy may now need to look elsewhere. In addition, defaulting on a HELOC brings with 
it the very real likelihood that the consumer’s home will be foreclosed upon.139 For these reasons, 
HELOCs are not advisable as a short-term cash management strategy for consumers looking for a 
replacement for the float that was built into the pre-reform check clearing. 
Finding themselves squeezed on all sides, some consumers are imbibing a mixture that combines 
a HELOC, credit cards, and payday loans. To say that this is a potentially lethal financial cocktail for the 
unsophisticated population of working poor is an alarming understatement.  
V. TWO RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  The Statutory Definitions of “Check” Under Both the U.C.C. and Regulation CC 
Should Be Amended to Remove the Requirement That They Are Payable on 
“Demand” 
The first recommendation is for both the re-drafters of the U.C.C. and Congress to change the 
definition of “check” to include drafts drawn on banks that are either time instruments or instruments 
that are payable on demand. As a result, checking account customers would have the option of issuing 
checks with short-term future due dates140 in addition to traditional bank drafts that are payable on 
demand.141 The benefit to bank customers who use short-term time drafts instead of those that are 
payable on demand would be that they would have control over the date on which the bank would debit 





138 Carolyn Bigda, When HELOC Freezes Over, CNN, 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/04/18/real_estate/heloc_freeze.moneymag/index.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2012). 
139 Eisenson & Castleman, supra note 131.   
140 To be clear, this Article refers to “short term” due dates in its recommendations because its goal is to 
replace check float and the corresponding self-help solutions which consumers lost after the implementation of the 
federal regulations. It is entirely possible, however, that under the new definition that this Article advocates for, parties 
to checks would be able to agree to dates that are either short-term or long-term. 
141 Delayed debit cards have existed in Europe as well. Many European countries have credit cards that are 
linked to bank accounts. Outstanding balances would be paid off in full at the end of the month from that account. This 
type of activity is now much less common. Finland, for example, used Visa cards solely as delayed debit cards until 2001. 
However, Visa customers can now use the cards as normal credit cards. See JOHN KELLY & AISLING REILLY, CREDIT 
CARD DEBT IN IRELAND: RECENT TRENDS 1 (2005); President Bush stated that “[o]nce this crisis is resolved, there will 
be time to update our financial regulatory structures. Our 21st century global economy remains regulated largely by 
outdated 20th century laws.” Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 5, 57 (2009).  
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their accounts to pay checks that are deposited when issued but prior to the date when they are payable. 
This would give parties to checks control over the timing of the payment of the checks in the cases 
where their checks are issued with due dates; and once again allow them to issue checks that would not 
be paid immediately. This is better because it opens the opportunity to allow checking account 
customers to bargain for the same amount of time that they once had, with fingers firmly crossed, under 
the old, pre-reform, slow check collection timing rules. 
I believe that having this option would appeal to most checking account customers, especially 
the working poor. My preliminary research reveals that this recommendation has great appeal to another 
important group of users of checks—business owners. This relatively financially powerful constituency 
has relied very heavily upon checks because they offer business owners controls when managing their 
cash needs, working capital, and record keeping. 
B.  Regulation CC Should Require Banks to Offer Checking Customers a New 
Check With a Future Due Date and That Can Be Deposited When Issued But 
Not Payable Until Due 
Payday loan store operators seem to recognize that consumers need this option and yet 
community and commercial bankers and their federal regulators do not. Therefore, my second 
recommendation is for Regulation CC to be amended adding a provision requiring the creation of a new 
bank product in the form of a check with a due date draft—or a check that is payable on a definite future 
date rather than on demand.142 This new check would have two date lines: one for the date when the 
check was issued (this is the purpose of the current date line on demand instruments); and the new, 
second line for the date when the check will be due and properly payable by the paying bank.  
This new category of check transactions would also match the expectations of parties who can 
negotiate freely to use, or to not use checks with a future due date. This new check will provide many 
consumers with a much-needed alternative to payday loan stores, credit cards, HELOCs, and other 
devices; thus ensuring benefits to the economic and financial integrity of consumers who are clearly 
demanding better alternatives and more flexible bank products.  
It also has the benefit of simplifying the law of negotiable instruments, both state and federal, by 
eliminating the unnecessary exception to the general rule that parties to all instruments have the 
flexibility to enter into commercial transactions confident that they can bargain for the most favorable 
terms they can muster, including whether they must be able to pay on demand or whether they will have 
until a future date to make payment according to their private transactional reasons and bargaining 
power. With today’s technology making it easier for banks to accommodate the tracking involved with 
sorting checks, the burden of implementation is far outweighed by the burdens on consumers, especially 
poor and minority consumers who have a clear need for this bank solution.143  
VI.  POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
                                           
142 See Appendix C for an example of what this new instrument may look like. 
143 In general, my proposal is for a way to replace the float once enjoyed by consumers who used checks to pay 
for purchases with the expectation that the presentation would be delayed for several days. The replacement proposed, 
therefore, would probably continue to be a very short term item with a due date that would arrive in the very near 
future—say, seven to twenty days out—when the item will become due; and prior to which it is not yet properly payable. 
See Appendix C: New proposed check with two date lines, one for the date of issuance that is currently featured on 
checks; and another for the new date due that can be either the same as the issuance date for demand checks, or with a 
date at a definite time in the future for checks that are time instruments under the new proposed redefinition of “check” 
for both Article 4 and Regulation CC. 
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 I have made two recommendations for changes in both the law and banking practices to help 
consumers navigate the post-reform checking landscape more successfully than they have heretofore. I 
assume that helping consumers in these ways would improve the track record of the reforms themselves, 
which are justified only to the extent that this federal intervention in states’ jurisdiction over the 
commercial lives of their citizens is based on the federal government’s interest in protecting consumers. 
Obviously, these recommendations are not minor, and they may be met with some criticism or 
objections. There are a number of foreseeable reasons that seem to explain why banks may balk at 
having to live with the recommendations, if implemented. This section attempts to address what I feel 
could be some of the more vigorous objections to my recommendations. 
A.  The “Redundancy” Objection 
 One possible objection may attack the necessity of the new instrument on the grounds that 
banks already offer overdraft protection for customers who write checks against insufficient funds. 
There is, however, an important distinction between offering a service to remediate a wrong and one that 
offers an option to engage in a positive transaction. This is especially important for poor and 
marginalized consumers who may not qualify for overdraft protection nor benefit from the service if it 
requires them first to be humiliated and admonished by a fee for being allowed to avoid harsher 
penalties. 
This new time draft would also not be redundant insofar as it is additive by increasing the 
number of payment methods that are available to buyers and sellers who could consider using this new 
payment instrument for their transactions at their option. Increased availability of options for completing 
and paying for their obligations is essential to the freedom of the parties to contracts to engage in 
commercial transactions that allow them to participate in a vigorous marketplace and to be creative in 
the way they agree to terms.  
B.  The “Implementation” Objection 
 Another potential objection to using the new time check is that the product could be difficult to 
implement. How would a bank process checks that are due on various different future dates? In today’s 
technological environment, I do not think that this would be hard at all. Banks have been forced to ramp 
up their use of sophisticated technology in order to achieve the objectives of rules of regulators and 
judges for various other purposes. In fact, the federal regulation that first required expedited check 
collection stated that the law was timely because the banks had the available technology to implement 
the changes and that additional regulations would follow as technology improved over time.  This same 
technology can be employed for this purpose, as well.144   
Modern pre-printed checks are embedded with Magnetic Ink Character Recognition software 
(MICR codes) that allow banks to encode information into checks and to retrieve it later. For example, 
checks are now pre-printed so that their MICR lines are populated with information such as the bank’s 
American Banking Association routing number, the customer’s checking account number, and the check 
number. Additional information can be added to the check throughout its life as well, such as when the 
amount of the check has been added after it has been presented and paid; or when additional bank 
endorsements are made on the back of checks during the collection process. Using this existing 
technology, MICR code positions could be dedicated for use whenever a check that has been deposited 
has a due date that is different from its issuance date.   
                                           
144 Expedited Funds Availability Act (E.F.A.A.), supra at 24. 
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With today’s technology, a check that is issued today but not properly payable until two weeks 
from now could be deposited for collection today (instead of waiting two weeks to deposit a post-dated 
check), and the paying bank could input the payment date information that would result in the payment 
of the item on the future date instead of immediately. Banks could program available positions in the 
MICR line or use other technology already being used during the process of posting checks to 
correspond to the due date for the time instrument.  
C.  General Business Objections 
A final, practical objection is that banks simply may not be sure that a suitable business model 
can be developed. Banks currently earn substantial revenue from the fees they charge when a consumer 
has written a check with insufficient funds. Banks will charge fees ranging from $15 to $40 per check to 
avoid bouncing the check. Bank service fees are a major source of revenue for banks with $32.6 billion in 
fees collected in 2003.145 Banks will want to charge a fee for the service, no doubt, so vigilance should be 
used to make sure that such fees are reasonable and subject to limitations akin to those that govern fees 
for stop payment orders.  In general, however, I have no objection to a reasonable fee for this new 
service. 
No matter the precise reason, banks will undoubtedly need to be prodded to offer this option in 
the form of a new check with a future due date, especially given the fact that they have not offered it on 
a voluntary basis heretofore. It is for this reason that my second recommendation calls for a new federal 
regulation to compel banks to make this new check available and to honor them according to their 
terms, including a term specifying timing of payment. 
VII.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Check collection reform at the Federal level was necessary because of the length of time that it 
took to collect checks under the U.C.C., but because the traditional check is a demand instrument and, 
therefore, payment is due immediately to the person entitled to enforce it. An instrument that is due 
immediately should be capable of being paid without delay, and certainly in less than two weeks, or even 
one week. Demand instruments are due immediately, and yet it was impossible for payees to receive 
payment immediately using the traditional system of slow bank collections. 
It is axiomatic to say that a law that is incapable of being enforced is bad law. Similarly, a right 
that cannot be enjoyed is a wrong. The reason the reforms to the check collection timing rules are 
problematic is not because they are not necessary—they were. Rather, the problem is that they were 
implemented as though they existed in a vacuum and without a full understanding of all of the formal 
and informal dynamics within the old system. I think that it is very important to consider that consumers 
were accustomed to, and continued to need, checks that were collected more slowly than they were 
under the new expedited collection regulations ushered in by the reforms. The Federal Reserve 
Governing Board failed to provide for the ongoing demand by consumers for a financial product that 
was a replacement for the old slow-to-be-collected check, but that was still a check, not something else! 
Specifically, consumers needed a check that was not payable immediately.  
The controlling law governing the creation of different types of negotiable instruments, 
including checks, is still U.C.C. Article 3. Under Article 3, there is no requirement that checks must be 
payable on demand. Although they are never created as such, consumer transactions could be completed 
                                           
145 See Thomas P. Lehman, Contrasting Payday Loans to Bounced Check Fees, CONSUMER CREDIT RESEARCH 
FOUNDATION, http://www.creditresearch.org/editor/assets/files/050608ContrastingPdayLoans.pdf (last visited Nov. 
25, 2012).   
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using checks that are issued on demand with due dates just as readily as when they are issued without 
due dates.  
Clearly, consumers’ behavior changed dramatically in ways that have hurt the U.S. economy and 
have contributed to the current economic crisis. These changes are traceable, at least in part, to 
consumer demand for short amounts of time delays between the time of their transaction and the time 
when payment is completed. What payday loan store operators seem to understand is that consumers 
need a relatively short amount of time before they have money in their accounts that is roughly 
equivalent to the time between their pay checks (in the United States, this is two weeks). 
Banks in the United States have failed to compete with payday loan store operators even though 
it is clear that there is a huge demand for short-term financial relief in the checking account customer 
base. The solution is not to go back to a slower collection system for demand drafts, but a reasonable 
response that gives consideration to a variety of factors. 
The first recommendation is to change the definition of “check” under the applicable U.C.C. 
and Federal regulations.  The change would remove from the definition the exception that makes all 
checks “payable on demand.” Implementation of this recommendation would require the re-drafters of 
the U.C.C. and the Federal Reserve Governing Board to redefine “check” under the U.C.C. and 
Regulation CC, respectively, to accommodate the need to allow consumers to bargain for the inclusion 
of a due date term when issuing personal checks. Consequently, checks would become like all other 
negotiable instruments—payable either “on demand,” or “at a definite date” at the option of the parties. 
This approach is already authorized by existing U.S. laws of negotiable instruments. It would also match 
the expectations of parties who can negotiate freely to use or to not use the new payment instrument. It 
will provide many consumers with a much needed alternative to payday loan stores. 
The second recommendation is for Regulation CC to be amended to require banks to offer a 
new service that would recognize and honor the timing of payment terms of any check that had a due 
date just as easily as they do for checks that are payable on demand.  
Both of these changes will go far to improve the prospects of consumers who are clearly 
demanding better alternatives and more flexible bank products.  
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